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I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this text is to discuss in a rather critical way the so called many worlds inter-
pretation (MWI) proposed originally by H. Everett in 1957 [1]. I am a proponent of the pilot
wave interpretation (PWI) defined by L. de Broglie in 1927 and D. Bohm in 1952 [2] and
while MWI shares with PWI a strong commitment for determinism there are also funda-
mental differences between the two approaches. The most important one concerns probably
how both theories attempt to interpret quantum probability within their own ontological
frameworks and this will be the topic of the present chapter. As I will show however MWI
is more difficult to accept than PWI in the sense that it has dramatic problems with its
ontology which cannot be ignored if we want to interpret probabilities.
First, let us say a few words about ontology. MWI and PWI are realistic approaches
to quantum mechanics. This means that they are trying to introduce a clean ontological
structure into the formalism of quantum mechanics. What is indeed so extraordinary about
quantum mechanics is that the formalism appeared in 1925-1927 without a clear ontological
framework in complete opposition with classical approaches. Instead, N. Bohr, W. Heisen-
berg, M. Born and others managed to develop a pragmatic and instrumentalist interpretation
in which only macroscopic apparatuses and detectors possess a ‘clear’ definition. This way
of thinking, very much in harmony with the dominant positivism of this time, relies on the
need to consider as existing only what is seen by an ‘observer’ (i.e. the so called quantum
observable). In classical physics this positivistic approach was already introduced by the
philosopher E. Mach, with his phenomenalistic philosophy of science, and by the chemist W.
Oswald with his strong criticism of atomism (i.e., in his debate with L. Boltzmann). The
logical positivism of M. Schlick, R. Carnap, P. Franck, and H. Reichenbach perpetuated
this methodology in the XX’s century and considered that ontology is pure metaphysics
and should be removed of any positive science (actually they are strongly mistaken: any
science is necessarily metaphysical on its theoretical ground as shown already by D. Hume.
Theory is a pure creation of the human mind and needs to be tested with experimental
facts. This is the basis of the hypothetico-deductive method which was in particular de-
fended by L. Boltzmann and later by A. Einstein in his debated with W. Heisenberg and
N. Bohr). However, Bohr’s way of thinking is not completely identical to these various pos-
itivist approaches. For Bohr the problem is mainly experimental and is associated with the
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existence of the quantum of action ~. Indeed, the classical ontologies based on waves and
particles are not able to give a clear unambiguous picture of quantum reality as shown for
instance by the famous wave-particle duality paradox. Therefore, one should try a different
minimalist approach in which these classical concepts, while necessary for the empirical de-
scription of phenomena, do not have the same ontological values as in the classical world.
The Copenhagen interpretation says something like that: Take the Schrodinger equation
i~
∂
∂t
|Ψ〉t = Hˆ|Ψ〉t (1)
with its wave function |Ψ〉t and its hamiltonian Hˆ. Don’t try to ‘see’ a physical propagation
of a wavy thing; use it as a practical tool for defining a probability obtained by a ‘classical
observer’. The observer, sentient or not, (detector or automaton are part of the interpre-
tation as well) possesses a well defined position in space and time and is therefore foreign
to the quantum formalism. Quantitative statements are introduced into the theory through
Born’s probability rule which reads
Pα(t) = |〈α|Ψt〉|2 (2)
where Pα, the probability of the outcome α (associated with the observable operator Aˆ) , is
related to the quantum state by squaring the norm of the amplitude cα(t) = 〈α|Ψt〉 (where
we have the eigenvalue relation Aˆ|α〉 = α|α〉). Ontological questions about what happens to
the system between the preparation and the measurement are beyond the scope of Bohr’s
interpretation. This answer is fine for an experimentalist in his lab and can be used with
confidence for all practical purposes (FAPP). However, this methodology keeps open some
unsolved fundamental questions. Questions such as the meaning of the wave function for
the Universe, or the Schrodinger cat, or Wigner’s Friends, or the Heisenberg shifty split, and
so on and so forth are very pertinent and they cannot simply be escaped by labeling them
metaphysical. After all, the quantum wave theory was developed by Schrodinger before Bohr
gave his interpretation and there is no reason why the Copenhagen method should be the
only pertinent one. Actually, the situation is even a bit ironical since Bohr’s interpretation
came only of late. De Broglie proposed his own ‘double solution’ theory already in 1925,
before the Schrodinger equation was discovered (de Broglie was using the Klein-Gordon
equation which he invented for his own purpose). Schrodinger proposed his own theory in
1926. In fact de Broglie’s view contains as a sub-product the PWI while Schrodinger’s, if
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correctly interpreted in the configuration space has as a necessary consequence MWI (as is
recognized by Everett himself in his PhD thesis [1]).
II. EVERETT AND BOHM
Now, I will try to define briefly the ontology of MWI and PWI. I will start with PWI.
In PWI the wave function |Ψ〉t has an ontological meaning independently of the existence
or nonexistence of the observer. |Ψ〉t is an actual guiding wave in a real quantum field
for particles which are somehow surfing on the wave. Here I will be rather conservative
and consider only the non-relativistic case for a single particle of mass m without magnetic
potential. The velocity of the point like particle in PWI is given by
v(t) =
d
dt
x(t) =
~
m
Im[
∇ψ(x(t), t)
ψ(x(t), t)
]. (3)
This guidance formula is enough for solving paradoxes such as wave-particle duality by
defining a complex trajectory for the particle. The wave carries the particle into regions
where the field is non vanishing and omits regions where the quantum field cancels, therefore
offering a contrasting view to the Bohr-Heisenberg dictum that such kind of representation
should be prohibited (in the same way the famous ‘no-go’ theorem by von Neumann [3]
vanishes into pure smoke [2, 4]). Alternatively, we can introduce a quantum potential QΨ
acting on the particle and modifying the newtonian force induced by the external potentials
V (x, t) [2]. In the configuration space for many particles x1(t),x2(t) etc... the theory is
highly nonlocal and can be used to solve the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox (EPR)[5] in
full agreement with Bell’s theorem [2, 6]. I point out that I was deliberately quite unprecise
and vague concerning the nature of the quantum field Ψ. Indeed, in PWI, Ψ guides the
particles but there is no reaction of the particle on the wave. It is for this reason better to
wait for a better understanding of the ontology of the wave function in the future. Probably,
PWI, if it survives, will have to be modified or completed by a more satisfying theory in
which particles and fields (manifested through waves) will be dynamically connected. This
was the hope of both de Broglie and Bohm with different strategies and we should not here
comment further. Anyway, even if such a theory would exist one day, this doesn’t mean
that the current PWI will not be correct anymore in the same way that Newton’s theory
of gravitation is not completely invalidated by general relativity. Additionally, as it was
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pointed out many times by de Broglie there is a strong analogy between the status of Ψ in
the PWI and the action S(q, t) in the old Hamilton-Jacobi theory. Therefore, we will here
only consider Ψ as an effective field or a ‘nomological entity’ keeping its understanding for
future works.
Now, of course PWI makes sense only if we can introduce probabilistic elements into the
theory in order to explain Born’s formula Eq. 2. Schrodinger’s equation contains enough
material to do that unambiguously. Indeed, from the local current conservation law ∇ · J+
∂tρ = 0 with J(x, t) = v(t)ρ(x, t) and
ρ(x, t) = |ψ(x, t)|2, (4)
it is obviously ‘natural’ to interpret ρ(x, t) as a density of presence for the particle located
at x at time t. The local conservation plays the role of Liouville theorem’s in statistical me-
chanics. Therefore, if ρ(x, t) is effectively interpreted as a density of probability of presence
P (x, t) at a given time the interpretation will still be valid at any other times in agreement
with the conservation law. This was essentially the reasoning of de Broglie in 1927 and of
Bohm in 1952. However, one can try to go further and attempt to justify the probability law
P (x, t) = |ψ(x, t)|2 with other assumptions. This will be very similar to modern statistical
mechanics trying to justify the microcanonical, or canonical Boltzmann-Gibbs ensemble with
deeper reasonings. Several attempts have been done in the recent years focussing on either
H-theorem, coarse graining, Boltzmann-Typicality, and deterministic chaos (for a review see
[7]). I will not discuss that further since my aim was only to point that PWI is very similar
to classical physics, no better no worse. The difficulties and questionings about equilibrium
and non-equilibrium cited by Boltzmann are now translated in the PWI framework into
the question of how to justify the uniqueness of quantum equilibrium and how to reach
such an equilibrium. The solutions are probably very similar for the classical and quantum
cases (but the role of entanglement and non locality is still not so clear) so that solving the
problem in classical statistical mechanics would give a strong insight on the quantum PWI
version.
Let us now turn to MWI. As said before, MWI is mainly the strict application of
Schrodinger’s original theory in the configuration space. In MWI, ψ is an ontological field en-
tity as in PWI. But here there is not particle at all only a continuous wave! For Schrodinger
in the case of the single electron, the wave function e|ψ(x, t)|2 describes a local electron
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charge density not a probability. The quantum field ψ(x, t) in such a theory is somehow
very similar to the classical electromagnetic field in the old fashioned Maxwell’s theory, or
to the metric tensor in general relativity. In recent years, practitioners and proponents of
MWI, in particular L. Vaidman, often called |ψ(x, t)|2 a measure of existence or a degree
of reality [8] (the definition of L. Vaidman is more general of course but it agrees with
mine if by existing quantum ‘world’ we mean a state like |x〉. However since there is no
preferred basis in the Hilbert space the choice is arbitrary). This is clearly reminiscent of
Schrodinger’s language about charge density. Of course, if we think of the electron as a
delocalized charge distribution, we get the obvious objections already given by Bohr and
Heisenberg that a wave packet is spreading through space and time and that this could not
explain the experimental facts where electrons are appearing as localized grains or quanta
on detectors. In a diffraction or interference experiment the electron would go through both
holes and could not create a singular event on the screen. This is the well known historical
reason why the Schrodinger solution was quickly abandoned already in 1927. Furthermore,
observe that already for a single electron wave function the spatial coordinate representation
doesn’t have any particular status in the theory. We could also have chosen a momentum
representation |k〉 instead of |x〉 this would not have modified the information contained into
the quantum state. Therefore, there is no privileged basis in the MWI of Schrodinger and
Everett in the same way that it is not more or less physical to consider the Fourier transform
E˜(k) of an electromagnetic field as more or less real than the field E(x) itself. However,
we have something new in quantum physics. A superposition such as |here〉 + |there〉 for a
single electron means that two wave packets localized in the 3D space are superposed. Since
however experiments show that an electron is only detected here OR there, it seems to us
that MWI should have fundamental difficulties in dealing with this reality.
However, Everett resurrected Schrodinger’s theory by introducing entanglement in
the many particles configuration space. His hope was that entanglement added to the
Schrodinger idea would solve completely the measurement paradox and all other contradic-
tions. We will see that this is not so easy. To start with entanglement, consider an ideal
two-particle Universe. In the coordinate representation and at a given time t, the wave
function for the system is written ψ(x1,x2, t). What is here the meaning of x1, and x2?
For a single electron x is a spatial coordinate labeling the point in the 3D space. But here
we have two points of coordinates x1, and x2. This means that if we want to interpret
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ψ(x1,x2, t) as an ontological field we should extend a bit the classical framework of field
theory. Generally, in classical field theory we consider only local fields defined at a sin-
gle position. The field itself can obey a nonlinear equation in order to create for example
solitons or ‘bunched’ field. Here however, the quantum field ψ require two coordinates for
its definition x1, and x2. This involves a new form of non-locality or wholeness while the
equation (i.e Eq. 1) is kept strictly linear. How to call such a field? Maybe ‘web-field’
could be a good alternative name to wave function since it actually represents a correlation
between two or many points in space and time. The theory can of course be extended to the
relativistic domain using the Tomonaga-Schwinger equation for the functional Ψ[σ] where σ
is a space-like hyper-surface in the 4D Universe. Now, how will this solve the paradox of the
spreading electron which was a dead-end for the old Schrodinger interpretation? Consider
again our wave function ψ(x1,x2, t). Suppose at the initial time the system factorizes, i.e.,
ψ(x1,x2, t) = ψ1(x1, t)φ2(x2, t). We can take ψ1(x1, t) as a freely expanding wave packet
diffracted by an external potential like a double slit screen (the fact that the screen or more
generally an external potential is a classical concept is here irrelevant and it is there only to
simplify the discussion). The second wave function φ2(x2, t) is associated with a localized
wave-packet confined in, for example, a Coulomb potential, let’s says, in a energy level E0.
When the first electron collides with the second the system can exchange energy and mo-
mentum and this represents some information transfer to be used in a basic measurement
protocol. In other worlds, the modification of the second electron state will lead to entan-
glement and non-locality. Consider the final state
∑
i ψi(x1, t)φi(x2, t) where the sum is over
possible outcomes. If we consider only a two state system for φi then we have here a basic
electron detector plate with the ground state meaning undetected while the excited states
are recorded. Of course, we could also introduce a third electron localized in state χ3(x3, t)
before the interaction and actually factorized from the rest of the wave function. After the
interaction we will obtain a state like
ψ′
1
(x1, t)φg(x2, t)χe(x3, t) + ψ
′′
1
(x1, t)φe(x2, t)χg(x3, t) + ... (5)
where the dots indicate other terms irrelevant for the present purpose (for example the
states where electrons 2 and 3 are not disturbed by the interaction). Clearly, we have
here an entanglement representing a basic spatial correlator (the equivalent in optics would
be an Hanbury Brown and Twiss apparatus). If electron 2 is in the excited state then
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electron 3 is in the ground state and reciprocally, this is ‘10’ or ‘01’ information associated
with two different bits. In the language of Bohr’s interpretation this would mean that an
observer can only detect a particle once since there is only one electron 1. However, here
we are not in the Copenhagen instrumentalist framework but in the MWI. Our Universe
contains only three electrons and no observer at all. Still, with Everett’s web-function Eq. 5
represents an ontological field and the difference between |e2〉|g3〉 and |g2〉|e3〉 is completely
real in an objective sense (for example those states are orthogonal in the Hilbert space).
However, now comes the fundamental issue: since there is no collapse how should we interpret
the superposition given by Eq. 5 in MWI? A state like ψ′
1
|g2〉|e3〉 + ψ′′1 |e2〉|g3〉 could also
equivalently be written 1
2
(ψ′
1
+ψ′′
1
)(|g2〉|e3〉+ |e2〉|g3〉)+ 12(ψ′1−ψ′′1 )(|g2〉|e3〉− |e2〉|g3〉). Since
there is no observer able to collapse the state this equivalent representation shows that we
don’t have yet our macroscopic world where electrons appear either here or there but not
at both places. While entanglement allowed us to describe a measuring device in quantum
mechanics (i.e., it constitutes an example of the shifty split of the Heisenberg cut) it didn’t
apparently remove our problem in the MWI. In other words, the fact that we considered
more and more electrons didn’t solve the problem it only propagated it to a larger system
thanks to entanglement. Still, it was Everett’s hope that entanglement could somehow
solve the measurement issue: how could that be ? Everett’s strategy was to consider larger
and larger systems until we can consider a conscious being or at least machines or robots
sufficiently sophisticated to have memory sequences of recorded events. The hope was that
at a certain scale to be defined the ‘collapse’ (i.e. in the language of the MWI the ‘split’)
should occur. This is what we should now analyze. Considering the previous example, i.e.,
Eq. 5, we see that entanglement will indeed propagate to any other systems in interaction
with our detectors. If the detector is emitting a signal going to a larger system able to
memorize, i.e., to modify in a rather stable way a chemical, or molecular arrangement, in a
mechanical ‘brain’ we can imagine entangled state such as
ψ′
1
(x1, t)|⌣¨〉+ ψ′′1(x1, t)|⌢¨〉+ ... (6)
with obvious notations for the states of the brain. I point out that the ‘ket’ notation for
the brain is a compact way of speaking about 〈X1, X2, ..., XN |⌣¨〉 where N ∼ 1023 is the
number of particles in the brain (including its environment, the detectors, and ultimately all
the Universe). However the representation chosen is here irrelevant. Furthermore, we have
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here obviously 〈⌢¨|⌣¨〉 = 0 since the unitarity of the quantum evolution should preserve
the orthogonality of the pointer states present in Eq. 5 (i.e. 〈g2, e3〉|e2, g3〉 = 0). The
brain states are of course physical states since with Everett and von Neumann we accept
‘psychophysical parallelism’ [1, 3] that is the functionalist view whereby the mind supervenes
on the brain like software on hardware. Everett’s strong belief was that the state of awareness
or consciousness of the observer or robot is a new essential ingredient in the theory. However,
don’t forget that Everett believed strongly in functionalism and that for him the introduction
of minds in quantum mechanics was very different from what was later assumed by believers
in the so called many-minds interpretation(s) [9] in which ‘minds’ different of brain states
(i.e. without obvious supervenience relations with the hardware) played a fundamental role
as well. I will not discuss such alternative approaches here since the abandonment of the
psychophysical parallelism is definitely too much for me.
Going back to Eq 6, we see that these two awareness states exist and evolve as if they were
alone. The reason is that they constitute two independent solutions of Eq. 1 (I will develop
that important point below). But as we said before unitarity allows many representations
of Eq. 6 like for example
(ψ′
1
+ ψ′′
1
)√
2
(|⌣¨〉+ |⌢¨〉)√
2
+
(ψ′
1
− ψ′′
1
)√
2
(|⌣¨〉 − |⌢¨〉)√
2
+ ... (7)
Here we have superposed ‘cat’ states |⌣¨〉 ± |⌢¨〉 the meaning of which is unclear. What is
the ‘feeling’ of a brain in such a cat state ? Is this not a fatal problem for MWI? Are we
not introducing furtively a new axiom favoring a representation, i.e., a preferred basis at the
detriment of not preserving full unitarity?
However we point out that for Everett the awareness basis is not so much privileged but
better considered as ‘special’ or ‘particular’ in the sense that we are always free to use a
different basis if we wish. Therefore, unitarity is not violated. Still, to be convincing, the
MWI should explain why |⌣¨〉 ± |⌢¨〉 is not an awareness state. May be there are actually
such mental states like |⌣¨〉± |⌢¨〉 but that we can not feel how it is to be like them. Maybe
the question is a bit like asking how it feels like to be a bee or a cat. Maybe not. This is a
bit magic or mysterious for many and it is probably why some tried to shift from the MWI
to the many-minds interpretation(s). Of course, if the two brain states evolve independently
there is no apriori reason to mix them but what is more is that we can apparently use
an argumentation based on inter-subjectivity and entanglement to see why we never meet
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people in such cat states. Indeed, if I met You in the street, going out of the lab, we could
create an entangled state like
ψ′
1
(x1, t)|⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉+ ψ′′1(x1, t)|⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉+ ... (8)
Therefore, there has to be an inter-subjective agreement between awareness states of Me and
You. Moreover, like for Eq. 6 and 7, there are also states like |⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉±|⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉 but
now they involve Me, You and all the part of the Universe having interacted with us. There
is thus an inter-‘subjective’ agreement between the cat states since Eq. 8 can be written like
(ψ′
1
(x1, t) + ψ
′′
1
(x1, t))√
2
(|⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉+ |⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉)√
2
+
(ψ′
1
(x1, t)− ψ′′1(x1, t))√
2
(|⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉 − |⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉)√
2
... (9)
but you should not bother about this since neither Me nor You are feeling such cat states
separately.
However, this argumentation is not completely convincing to everyone (see for example
Penrose [10]) since there are apparently other counterintuitive ways to write Eq. 8. For
instance what about writing Eq. 8 like
(ψ′
1
(x1, t)|⌣¨Me〉+ ψ′′1 (x1, t)|⌢¨Me〉)√
2
(|⌣¨You〉+ |⌢¨You〉)√
2
+
(ψ′
1
(x1, t)|⌣¨Me〉 − ψ′′1 (x1, t)|⌢¨Me〉)√
2
(|⌣¨You〉 − |⌢¨You〉)√
2
+ ...? (10)
The cat state for You are now involved while I am mixed with the first electron state. The
well known problem with such an expression is that it is not obvious and univocal to fac-
torize the Me and You like I did (this is the reason why I wrote Me and You inside the
same ket vector in Eqs. 8, 9). Indeed, the two protagonists are strongly interacting with a
complex environment. The possibility to separate Me from You is therefore in large part
arbitrary and in practice physically impossible in the lab. Where to put the border be-
tween Me and You is a bit a question of taste. This is clearly reminiscent of the Wigner’s
friend paradox: If before interacting with my friend I am in the state |⌣¨Me〉 + |⌢¨Me〉 it is
hoped that after meeting we should be in a state like |⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉+ |⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉 and that
possible state factorization doesn’t make any sense. Also, for the same reason a state like
|⌣¨Me, ∼¨You〉+ |⌢¨Me, ∼¨You〉 can not be easily factorized as (|⌣¨Me〉+ |⌢¨Me〉)|∼¨You〉 since the
border separating Me from You is fuzzy and shifty. We would like to obtain some kind of
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superselection rules [11] here in order to prove that such strange cat states are forbidden in
nature. For such reasons, many proponents in the MWI like D. Zeh [12] or D. Wallace and
S. Saunders [1, 13], following also W. Zurek [13], often emphasize that decoherence should
be taken into account in this argumentation.
Decoherence is the averaging of an operator over the ‘irrelevant’ degrees of freedom asso-
ciated with the environment [12]. The idea is that a macroscopic quantum object like a brain
should be considered as an open system interacting with its environment. By averaging over
degrees of freedom associated with this environment we can transform a pure system into
a mixture characterized by for example rate equations. Overlap terms between different
possible environments will decay in time very quickly so that we can use a mixture instead
of a pure evolution in the Hilbert space. This is a nice way for removing quantum interfer-
ences from a reduced evolution and it is reminiscent of the famous which-path-experiment in
the Young double slit setup. Decoherence supposes already that we can interpret |ψ|2 as a
probability in agreement with Born’s rule Eq. 2. This creates problems for both Bohr’s and
Everett’s interpretations but not for the PWI. Indeed, for Bohr the observer or the apparatus
is a key ingredient. But, tracing over some degrees of freedom means that the environment is
actually needed as an observer in this theory (‘the environment is watching you’). This is an
amendment to the original Copenhagen interpretation but this is not actually so dramatic
since the theory is instrumentalist so that improving on it does not really touch the problem
of ontology. This problem doesn’t exist at all for the PWI since probabilities have a classical
meaning here. Tracing over the environment will only introduce a supplementary emerging
ignorance like in thermodynamics. For the MWI however, there is no yet probability so that
decoherence cannot be interpreted in the same way. We have only degrees of reality and
measure of existence so that tracing actually means summing over some of these degrees of
reality. How can this help the MWI? It seems rather to create additional problems. The
answer is not so clear because in my opinion proponents of the MWI didn’t yet reach a
consensus. One point which is often emphasized is that the privileged basis should be very
robust in the sense that only in this basis is the system immune to the interaction with the
environment. This means in particular that if an experimentalist was able to prepare and
isolate during even a short period a superposition like |⌣¨〉±|⌢¨〉 the system should decohere
very fastly, i.e., in a time probably smaller than 10−20s [14]. While this result is generally
interpreted using probability it has also an absolute meaning as a measure-theoretical way
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to define effective orthogonality between independent observer branches.
In this context the ideas of D. Wallace [1, 13, 15] on ‘patterns’ are very interesting for
the MWI. What is a pattern? Referring to D. Dennett’s work, Wallace interprets a pattern
like a cat or a tiger as an emerging structure inside the quantum evolution. The border
of an emerging structure is not always clearly defined at the macroscopical scale since the
number of atoms is huge. Including some atoms in You or Me is a bit arbitrary so that we
generally don’t care about this shifty border between observers. We already discussed this
problem before and we should develop this a bit more. Rigorously, we should call a pattern
any complete solution of Eq. 1 for a given Hamiltonian. Referring again to the single elec-
tron problem if |here(t)〉 and |there(t)〉 are separate solutions and therefore patterns then
the sum |here(t)〉 + |there(t)〉 is also representing a viable pattern of the theory. However,
the linearity doesn’t destroy the individual patterns ‘here’ and ‘there’ and in that sense it
really means that we have two localized electrons here. In the same sense |⌣¨〉 and |⌢¨〉 are
representing patterns if they are independent solutions of the full evolution (including the
environment). The linear superposition Eq. 6 is also an allowed pattern so that we have re-
ally two ‘Me’ here: one happy and one unhappy (Wallace calls that favoring multiplicity over
superposition [15]). Moreover, while the orthogonality of the states was here a consequence
of the orthogonality of the pointer states this is not necessary. Two solutions of Eq. 1 can
be viable patterns without being orthogonal. Still, in practice decoherence will ensure that
〈⌢¨|⌣¨〉 ≈ 0 is a good approximation after a very short time due to the complexity of the
environment [11] (neglecting Poincare´’s recurrence over the finite time of human or Universe
existence) and we could say that decoherence somehow create and select emerging patterns
behaving classically (i.e., without interference) from the full spectrum of possible solutions
(those solutions that have no good thermodynamical properties are not considered).
There is an important point to emphasize here: considering a single photon of energy
E interacting with a beam splitter, we generally say that we end up with two independent
possibilities |reflected〉 and |transmitted〉 which are added and represent two independent
pattern solutions of the free hamiltonian. This is however an approximation since the bound-
ary conditions at the beam splitter make these two ‘solutions’ inseparable. Only the sum
|reflected〉+ |transmitted〉 is a solution of the time independent scattering problem. Still, for
practical purposes we are dealing with finite wave packets well localized in space and time.
This means that after interacting with the external potential (the beam splitter) we can
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approximately and asymptotically consider the two solutions |reflected〉 and |transmitted〉
as independent and evolving freely. So when we say that we end up with two independent
branches this is already an approximation even with very simple systems and without includ-
ing macroscopic decoherence. I mention that because it is also trivially true for Eqs. 6, and 8
and patterns like ψ′
1
(x1, t)|⌣¨〉+ψ′′1 (x1, t)|⌢¨〉 or ψ′1(x1, t)|⌣¨Me, ⌣¨You〉+ψ′′1 (x1, t)|⌢¨Me, ⌢¨You〉
are not actually made of two independent sub-solutions but only constitute complete and
inseparable solutions of the full Universal evolution. If you think about that then you realize
that indeed |⌣¨〉 and |⌢¨〉 cannot in general be rigorously independent patterns albeit seen
as emerging and approximate structures whose condition 〈⌢¨|⌣¨〉 ≈ 0 is very robust, due to
decoherence. Of course, cat patterns, as given in Eqs. 7 and 9, are not exact solutions as
well and we cannot really separate them from the full evolution. This at least shows that
the old debates about a preferred basis in the MWI is a bit empty. However, if patterns have
only an approximative meaning, they also let the question about the meaning of cat states
|⌣¨〉 ± |⌢¨〉 unanswered. It is probably better for these reasons to return to our provocative
answer: To be a in a state like |⌣¨〉±|⌢¨〉 is perhaps a bit like feeling as a bee or a cat. Maybe
it is here with us during all our life. Maybe not. The ontology of the MWI is definitely very
strange and debates about its self-consistency will certainly continue during many years in
many-worlds.
III. PROBABILITY IN THE MANY-WORLDS INTERPRETATION
Well, if this is enough for the ontology in the MWI interpretation, what about probabil-
ity? This is the weaker (worst?) point in the theory and it stirred up so much emotional
debates within the years that it could be too long to summarize all points and argumen-
tations here. Additionally, since decoherence needs a definition of probability to work, it
seems that introducing probability could also help the ontological problem in the MWI.
Now, Everett introduced probability in his MWI in two ways. The first way is actually
predating Gleason’s theorem [16] which Everett discovered independently in a simplified
version. I will not summarize this well known reasoning but just remind that its aim is to
find the most plausible measure µ(Ψ) in the Hilbert space which could represent a proba-
bility of occurence. The result, using some natural assumptions about linearity, is that the
most natural measure is the one given by Born’s law, i.e., Eq. 2. Still, this is not yet a
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probability but just the proof that if we are going to attribute a probability to the Ψ state
then Born’s law is the best choice [1]. In the recent years D. Deutsch [17], D. Wallace and
S. Saunders [1, 13] on the one side and W. Zurek on the other side [13, 18] tried to find
an alternative mathematical demonstration using some other symmetries (called envariance
by Zurek, and decision theory by Deutsch) than those considered by Gleason and Everett.
The reasoning is that due to entanglement we can in a natural and mathematical way give
a precise statement for Laplace’s principle of indifference in the quantum world. The result
is of course again Born’s law. For me the Gleason version and the envariance demonstration
have the same value. They both show that if one is going to introduce probability in the
quantum world, and therefore in the MWI, then Eq. 2 is the most natural choice. But
still there is no ned for probability in the MWI outside from experimental considerations
foreign to the theory. At that stage it is interesting to make a remark. Everett [1] and
later many authors such as Wallace and Brown [13, 15, 19], or Zurek [18] often claimed that
their bayesian definition of probability is no better nor worst than in classical physics so
that the situation is the same as for the PWI. Everett for example, wrote [1]: The situation
here is fully analogous to that of classical statistical mechanics, where one puts a measure
on trajectories of systems in the phase space by placing a measure on the phase space it-
self, and then making assertions (such as ergodicity, quasi-ergodicity, etc.) which hold for
“almost all” trajectories. By almost Everett means here a measure-theoretic definition like
the one proposed by Lebesgue. However, having a measure is not enough to define a prob-
ability. For example, we could use Noether symmetry theorem which shows that Maxwell
equations involve a conserved current and interpret this result as a probability. Still, this
is not necessary ,i.e., not required by the theory. We need a clear ontological statement
for introducing probability in a theory and this involves dynamical elements like particle
randomness. In the PWI for example, the conservation law ∇ · J + ∂tρ = 0 is clearly not
enough to generate the probability interpretation it only gives an indication. As a proof
observe that Madelung [20] found simultaneously with de Broglie the guidance formula and
the quantum potential. But he interpreted them instead as continuous hydrodynamic fluid
equations more in phase with the old Schrodinger interpretation. Modern practitioners of
the MWI often think that by comparing their own approaches with the one developed for
instance by Gibbs using Liouville’s theorem could give a legitimacy to the various concepts
of probability they propose. However, Gibbs statistical mechanics is nothing without the
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physical interpretation proposed by Boltzmann and Maxwell within the kinetic theory (as
Gibbs himself recognized in the introduction to his book [21]). Therefore, we should not try
to extract too much from Gleason’s theorem, decision theory or envariance.
To introduce anyway probability we should love to the second step of Everett’s reasoning
and consider a statistical experiment. Suppose for instance a single quantum source emit-
ting photons one by one, all directed on a balanced beam splitter. Each photon is either
transmitted or reflected with equal probabilities and the detectors (i.e., avalanche photo-
diodes) register singular events in only one of the two path at once. The statistics is of
course a simple Bernoulli process and the result, following the weak law of large numbers,
is naturally in agreement with Born’s rule that the number of photons detected in each
detectors are equal on the long run. Now, this is of course a reading which make sense in
Bohr’s instrumentalist interpretation as well as in the PWI. In the the PWI photons follow
trajectories determined by Eq. 3 (or some equivalent [22]) and by the initial conditions in
the wave packets (i.e. for example the particle’s position at a given time). The theory is
very similar to classical mechanics and therefore the PWI contains enough ingredients to
introduce statistics in quantum mechanics.
In the MWI this is not the case since the continuous wave or field is all what we have.
The wave packet impinging on the beam splitter behaves like a classical Maxwell wave: it
is separated into two equal parts but there is no probability in this construction. However,
should we be surprised? The MWI is indeed based on the pure unitary Schrodinger dynam-
ics which only accepts the regular solution of Eq. 1. There is no singularity, no fine graining
in this theory for generating randomness. It is therefore surprising that Everett in his thesis
[1] followed by B. DeWitt and his student N Graham [23] believed that probability could
appear in the long run in the MWI. It is of course true that in a Bernoulli process with
N repetition of the beam splitter experiment there is W (nt) = N !/nt!(N − nt)! possible
branches in which nt photons are transmitted while N − nt photons are reflected. Using
Stirling formula N ! ≈ NN (this is a crude approximation) in the long run limit N → +∞
we get W (n˜t) ≈ 2N for n˜t/N = 1/2 which means that the overwhelming majority of the Ev-
erett ‘branches’ will be following Born’s law. Still, this has only value in a measure-theoretic
sense. We added branches to find a degree of reality equal to W (nt)/2
N , but nowhere there
is a reason why we should do that. In the same way that typicality is not probability there
is here no possibility for extracting ‘a tend to from a does’[17]. Additionally, for practical
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experiments we don’t use an infinite number of registered events. The PWI can deal with
that only because the theory is deterministic and because randomness only results from the
choice of the initial conditions for the particle positions. There is no need for an infinite
number of events in the same way that in kinetic theory a gas doesn’t contain an infinite
number of molecules (the Gibbs ensemble is just an idealization after all).
I stress that my comments are somehow well known [24] and that we can still find some
proponents of the MWI who are convinced that Everett’s answer is the good one. In the
recent year D. Wallace and S. Saunders following the ideas of D. Deutsch [1, 13] introduced
bayesianism into the MWI in order to save the theory (this is what they called decision theory
following L. J. Savage [25]). Quoting D. Wallace on his discussion on patterns [15]: ‘we have
at least shown that it is rational for the observer to assign some weighting: in other words,
we have shown that there is room for probabilistic concepts (at least the decision-theoretic
sort) to be accommodated in the theory. In other words, the observer doesn’t know where
he will go after ‘branching’ so that it seems legitimate to call that a bayesian choice. Or is
it not? Bayesianism following Ramsey or de Finetti is mainly a subjective interpretation of
probability based on inferences and degrees of belief as used by poker players or insurance
companies. Still, a poker player can only use his subjective notion of probability in con-
nection with empirical evidences. Such empirical evidence means frequency of occurrences
(I.e., ideally using an infinite sequence following von Mises cf. however our remarks made
earlier concerning Gibbs’s ensembles [26]). Therefore we are sent back to our first criticism
concerning the Everett, DeWitt-Graham reasoning.
As we explained before the unitary Schrodinger evolution is too regular and simple for
implying objective probability and randomness. And it is therefore difficult for me to un-
derstand how some could even hope to obtain physical probability directly from subjective
bayesianism (my criticism concerns also the new trends about Qbism even though Qbism
is actually the Copenhagen counterpart of the decision theoretic view on the MWI). Fur-
thermore, I am feeling that the whole game of decision theory is a bit like meeting a pair
of twins or clones (see the very suggestive ‘Zaxtarian’ scenario proposed by B. Green [27]
based on the ‘sleeping beauty’ analogy by L. Vaidman [28]) and asking one of them what
was the probability to be the other. In that case, at least, ontogenesis (the fine grained
structures) make some difference but with the quantum states the symmetry is too high and
the fine-graining (unlike in the PWI) absent. Why therefore should we introduce probabil-
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ity? This is not convincing, and the problem is not that the observer doesn’t know where
he will go but rather that he will actually choose both ways since he will soon be sliced
into two quantum clones. The MWI is deterministic and there is no hidden variable with
unknown initial conditions which could tell you what was the path you really followed in
a quantum interferometer. Therefore, how can we speak of some results being likely and
others being unlikely when both take place? In one sense the strong symmetry required
by Zurek’s envariance, i.e., the quantum version of Laplace’s indifference principle, already
ruins the chance of success of the MWI in justifying the use of bayesian probability. Over
the years L. Vaidman often emphasized (as a kind of last chance for the MWI?) that prob-
ability should be postulated in the MWI [8]. If this is true, then we completely denature
the dream of Everett and therefore we will at the end obtain something like a new version
of the PWI and return to the original de Broglie’s proposal. In the following I will describe
some alternatives to the old MWI, which indeed, are going to explore this analogy with the
PWI.
IV. SAVING THE MANY-WORLDS?
In the recent years, several approaches have been proposed to modify or complete the
MWI. I already mentioned the various many-minds interpretations [9]. Such approaches
include in the theory some new ingredients which look a bit like hidden variables in the
PWI (in some versions the ‘minds’ are indeed flying over the wave-function like the electron
is surfing the guiding wave in the PWI: this is a romantic view). I will not analyze here such
provocative ideas, but the point is, indeed, that one way of saving the MWI is to go in the
direction of the PWI. This is what is interesting to me here since the proposal is actually
going far beyond the realm of the many minds interpretation(s). Indeed, the analogy with
the PWI is for example the path proposed by A. Valentini [13], in his many Bohmian worlds
theory. Such an approach is also advocated by several authors like F.J. Tipler and K. J.
Bo¨lstrom [29]. The main point is that the PWI allows a description of the wave function
of the whole Universe by adding a Gibbsian ensemble of Universes to the theory. Indeed, if
we consider and infinite number of copies of such a Universe all characterized by the same
wave function Ψ but in which the trajectories XΨ(t), for the large vector associated with the
N particles of the Universe in the configuration space, differ only by the choices concerning
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the initial conditions XΨ(t0), then we have a theory where many Bohmian worlds exist
independently of each others. This reminds us of the old criticism by D. Deutsch about
PWI as a MWI in a permanent state of chronical denial. Here, the aim is clearly to satisfy
both PWI and MWI proponents by reversing the critics. By introducing many copies of the
Universe we could, maybe, understand how the quantum potential can depend on the wave
function itself. N. Rosen [30] who was one of the first to study the PWI (even before Bohm)
gave up on this theory because it was not acceptable for him that a quantum potential
Qψ should depend somehow on the probability density (remember that for a single non
relativistic particle we have Qψ = − ~22m∆|ψ(x)|/|ψ(x)|). De Broglie renounced his PWI in
1930 in part for similar reasons: if the wave function is a ‘subjective’ element (the word is
from de Broglie), then how could a dynamics depends on statistics? De Broglie came back
to PWI in 1952 since this problem was not anymore a serious one for him. Still, we can
motivate the many Bohmian worlds view by introducing the quantum potential as a kind of
interaction between the different worlds. Actually this is even the only justification for the
many Bohmian worlds view. Personally, I am not so much convinced but the theory is fine
to study anyway since we don’t know yet where it will lead us.
To conclude this chapter, I would like to discuss a different provocative proposals for
modifying the MWI which I imagined some years ago. Since I am not taking it too seriously
I will call that model the jumper interpretation (JI). In the JI the idea is to find a stochastic
approach based on the MWI. I will consider first a single electron described by Ψ(x, t). My
suggestion is that at any time there is a single particle in the wave like in the PWI. The
particle is located at x at time t. The density of probability that it will be found at x′ at
any other time is simply given by
Pψ(x
′, t′) = |Ψ(x′, t′)|2. (11)
That’s more or less all. The evolution is completely stochastic and if the wave is going to
be diffracted then the electron is jumping from one place to a different one simply using
Born’s rule. As inPWI, there is an obvious privileged basis here: the spatial coordinate
representation but we could choose a different one. Also, the dynamics can look ‘crazy’.
First, the electron at time t′ has a non vanishing probability to appear at any place in the
wave whatever the distance separating the two points x and x′ (the velocity (x−x′)/(t− t′)
can therefore diverge). Second, consider a particle interacting with a beam-splitter. After
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crossing the apparatus we have now two separated wave packets. Still, from my JI the
particle can jump from one beam to the other completely randomly and this even if there
is a huge distance between them and even if there is a thick wall as an obstacle. The
theory also requires a privileged Lorentz Frame (like PWI). Indeed since there is not limit
for velocity the trajectories are allowed to go backward in time in some reference frames. A
privileged slicing of space-time allows us to define unambiguously the possible probability of
reaching a point using Born’s rule Pψ(x
′, t′) = |Ψ(x′, t′)|2 calculated in this preferred frame.
Actually, this model is a minimalist version of the PWI. Instead of being deterministic it
is stochastic. But still it shares with the PWI many common features. In particular, in a
state like |here(t)〉 + |there(t)〉 the particle is in one place at a time if we choose to favor
the x representation. If we take as preferred basis the momentum representation then the
system will not have position at all but rather a jumping momentum k in the distribution
|〈k|here(t)〉 + 〈k|there(t)〉|2. This JI could also be used to explain the EPR paradox by
including entanglement and by generalizing it to any possible Hilbert space (for example to
include spin or polarization variables). Consider for example a perfectly entangled photon
pair state like
|H〉1|H〉2 + |V 〉1|V 〉2 (12)
(where H, V denote horizontal and vertical polarization for photons 1 and 2). We require a
preferred basis for describing the stochastic dynamics, let say, |H〉i and |V 〉i (but the choice
could be different from pair to pair ). When the pair of photons is produced by the source
it jumps randomly from time to time into the states |H〉1|H〉2 or |V 〉1|V 〉2. Now the EPR
pair is directed in the Bell experiment with polarizing beam splitters and wave plates (for
selecting polarization bases). Due to the presence at each time of both waves |H〉1|H〉2 and
|V 〉1|V 〉2 the outcomes will follow the quantum predictions. The situation will be like for
the PWI involving a non locality, this time not due to the quantum potential but to the
mere existence of the two independent branches|H〉1|H〉2 and |V 〉1|V 〉2: one full, one empty
at each time.
The JI can be easily extended to measurement situations like the one described by Eq. 5
with many electrons. Since we have privileged some ket basis in this theory the quantum
state has a non ambiguous meaning in such a basis. This is again very similar to the PWI.
Here however the choice of the privileged basis is arbitrary: I could have chosen a momentum
space instead of a spatial coordinate this is my free ontological assumption. Now, of course
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there is this strange randomness induced by the jump of particles in the wave function.
What is this jump going to imply for the brain states and to the observers? Are they going
also to jump or to see these electrons jumping? If the electrons are jumping in front of my
eyes then the theory is of course invalidated. But, this is again a hidden variable model and
actually the nice thing is that this jump is really hidden (in the same way that Bohmian
trajectories are hidden in the PWI). Indeed, we see first that if we consider an awareness
state, like 〈X1, ....XN |⌣¨〉 written in the preferred basis (the question of the basis choice is
again arbitrary but to fix it let’s say that I am working mainly with spatial coordinates +
the spin degrees of freedom) then the mind somehow supervenes on the N particles position
at a given time (this is also true for the PWI). Second, in a state like Eq. 6
Ψ(x1, X1, ....XN , t) = ψ
′
1
(x1, t)〈X1, ....XN |⌣¨t〉+ ψ′′1(x1, t)〈X1, ....XN |⌢¨t〉+ ... (13)
there is only one electron 1 at x1 and one brain (whatever that means) located at
X1, ....XN . Like for the PWI it doesn’t matter if we use Eq. 6 with awareness states or
Eq. 7 with cat states. In both the probability of presence is given by the same number
PΨ(x1, X1, ....XN , t) = |Ψ(x1, X1, ....XN , t)|2. Now, the question about patterns plays an
important role here and discussing it now will also bring some new insights to the PWI.
What is important, indeed, is that in both the present JI, and in the PWI, the whole system
only occupies one position X = [x1, X1, ....XN ] at any time, only restricted by the condition
PΨ(x1, X1, ....XN , t) 6= 0. Now, you should remember that we are speaking about a quantum
measurement and that ψ′
1
(x1, t) and ψ
′′
1
(x1, t) are not spatially overlapping (at least at some
time t). It means that we have either
PΨ(x1, X1, ....XN , t) = |ψ′1(x1, t)|2|〈X1, ....XN |⌣¨t〉|2 (14)
or
PΨ(x1, X1, ....XN , t) = |ψ′′1(x1, t)|2|〈X1, ....XN |⌢¨t〉|2 (15)
depending on whether the electron position x1 is located in the support of ψ
′
1
or ψ′′
1
. The
functionalist theory together with the existence of particles therefore imposes that we can
only be in one of the two awareness states! This trick is not possible in the old MWI
interpretation since there is no preferred basis in Eq. 1. Additionally, it apriori gives a
reason to impose the spatial coordinates as preferred basis since using momentum with its
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delocalized quantum states ψ˜′
1
(k), ψ˜′′
1
(k) could not lead to such a clean resolution of the
observer identity crisis. This is, I think, a very good reason to prefer the PWI over the
MWI.
Now, with the present stochastic model the state given by Eq. 5 represents an electron
1 and the detectors as jumping together. The three entangled electrons will jump from
ψ′
1
|g2〉|e3〉 to ψ′′1 |e2〉|g3〉 randomly between two arbitrary times. In the state given by Eq. 6
with an observer entangled with electron 1 the whole system should also jump but, again,
only together. That means, that the observer cannot feel this jump at all! If he is jumping
all his memory sequence and the environment is jumping with him (this why I called the
theory crazy). Furthermore, if other observers are included in the formalism (see Eq. 8)
then the subjective agreement will also be automatic in the appropriate basis and You will
jump with Me always in agreement with quantum mechanics. I emphasize that this JI is
certainly a schematic structure not to be taken too seriously; but I think that it contains
mainly all the ingredients for a good hidden variable theory. In particular, the concept of
probability used in the model is clear enough to bypass all the contradictions contained in
the MWI. As a further development we could also present a many-jumpers interpretation
similar in philosophy to the many bohmian worlds approach discussed before. Again, this
could bring some philosophical advantages for explaining how the particles ‘know’ where
to jump. The inter communication between the different jumping worlds brings indeed
such an information to the whole ensemble of Universes and with this we will conclude our
‘many-stories’ theory.
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